| 1. |
On March 23, 2005, at 1:20 p.m., the ____________ Texas City Refinery suffered one of the worst industrial disasters in recent U.S. history. Explosions and fires killed 15 people and injured another 180, alarmed the community, and resulted in financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion. |
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Chevron |
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BP |
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Drill-Quip |
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Schlumberger |
| 2. |
______________ is a refining process that alters the fundamental arrangement of atoms in molecule without adding or removing anything from the original material. |
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Customized refining |
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Polymerization |
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Isomerization |
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None of the above |
| 3. |
Process unit startup is a significantly more hazardous period compared to normal oil refinery operations. |
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True |
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False |
| 4. |
Although several potential ignition sources were identified for the cause of the incident, the most likely ignition point was a ____________. |
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Burning cigarette |
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Idling diesel pickup truck |
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Electric sparks |
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None of the above |
| 5. |
Several aspects of the work environment encouraged such deviations. Management did not ensure that the startup procedure was regularly updated, even though the startup process had evolved and changed over time with modifications to the unit’s equipment, design, and purpose. |
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True |
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False |
| 6. |
The Board Operator’s decision-making was influenced by incorrectly calibrated instrumentation on the ___________________. |
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Raffinate splitter tower |
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ISOM unit |
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Electronic relay |
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None of the above |
| 7. |
The ISOM unit operator training program did not include which of the following? |
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Training for abnormal situation management, the importance of material balance calculations, and how to avoid high liquid level in towers. |
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Effective verification methods of operator knowledge and qualifications |
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A formal program for operations crews to discuss potentially hazardous conditions, such as startup or shutdown, to enhance operator knowledge and define roles. |
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All of the above |
| 8. |
In 1999, responding to London executives’ call to cut fixed costs 25 percent, Texas City refinery management agreed to implement a number of cost-reduction actions that affected training, including which of the following? |
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Reducing/limiting off-shift board operator training |
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Eliminating the central training organization of the refinery |
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Renegotiating with the Union to eliminate one hourly training coordinator |
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All of the above |
| 9. |
___________ used the FLACS (FLame ACceleration Simulator) Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) code. |
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Plant modelling |
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Dispersion modeling |
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Architectural design |
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All of the above |
| 10. |
Which of the following associations didn’t give recommendations after the BP refinery explosion and fire? |
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OSHA |
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BP Texas City Refinery |
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API |
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None of the above |
| 11. |
In regards to the root causes of the incidents the BP Texas City Managers did not do which of the following? |
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Ensure that operators were supervised and supported by experienced, technically trained personnel during unit startup, an especially hazardous phase of operation. |
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Inadequately addressed controlling major hazard risk. Personal safety was measured, rewarded, and the primary focus, but the same emphasis was not put on improving process safety performance. |
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Did not provide effective safety culture leadership and oversight to prevent catastrophic accidents |
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All of the above |
| 12. |
What does PQV in the term PQV Inspections stand for? |
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Primary Quality Valuation |
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Program Quality Verification |
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Primary Quality Verification |
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None of the above |
| 13. |
The ACC guidelines for MOC warn that changes to which of the following can significantly impact process safety performance? |
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Staffing levels |
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Changes in personnel |
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Policy changes (CMA, 1993) |
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All of the above |
| 14. |
Budget cuts and production pressures seriously impacted safe operations at Texas City. |
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True |
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False |
| 15. |
The organizational causes of the March 23, 2005, ISOM explosion are which of the following? |
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BP Group lacked focus on controlling major hazard risk. BP management paid attention to, measured, and rewarded personal safety rather than process safety. |
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BP Group and Texas City did not effectively evaluate the safety implications of major organizational, personnel, and policy changes. |
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BP Texas City lacked a reporting and learning culture. Reporting bad news was not encouraged, and often Texas City managers did not effectively investigate incidents or take appropriate corrective action. |
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All of the above |
| 16. |
The Texas City refinery was owned and operated by _____________ prior to the merger with BP. |
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SWE Industries |
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Amoco Corporation |
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Amica Corporation |
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None of the above |
| 17. |
In 1992, _______________ issued a serious citation to the Texas City refinery alleging that nine relief valves from vessels in the Ultraformer No. 3 (UU3) did not discharge to a safe place and exposed employees to flammable and toxic vapors. |
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OSHA |
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EPA |
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PET |
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Texas Refinery Board |
| 18. |
One industry standard used by the chemical, petrochemical, and hydrocarbon processing industries to evaluate facility siting in a PHA is ____________, "Management of Hazards Associated with Locations of Process Plant Buildings. |
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API 722 |
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API 732 |
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API 742 |
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API 752 |
| 19. |
The goal of a ______________ program is to ensure that all refinery instrumentation, equipment, and systems function as intended to prevent the release of dangerous materials and ensure equipment reliability. |
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Reliability |
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Mechanical integrity |
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Maintenance |
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All of the above |
| 20. |
Several instruments in the ISOM raffinate splitter section failed, likely due to inadequate maintenance and testing, contributing to the incident. |
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True |
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False |
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